FIRST AMENDMENT LAW REVIEW
Volume 11 | Issue 3

Article 4

3-1-2013

The Gospel according to the Warden: RLUIPA, the
First Amendment, and Prisoners' Religious Liberty
Requests
Ethridge B. Ricks

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/falr
Part of the First Amendment Commons
Recommended Citation
Ethridge B. Ricks, The Gospel according to the Warden: RLUIPA, the First Amendment, and Prisoners' Religious Liberty Requests, 11 First
Amend. L. Rev. 542 (2013).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/falr/vol11/iss3/4

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in First Amendment
Law Review by an authorized editor of Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact law_repository@unc.edu.

The Gospel According to the Warden: RLUIPA, The First
Amendment, and Prisoners' Religious Liberty Requests
Ethridge B. Ricks*
INTRODUCTION

In a classic scene from the movie The Shawshank
Redemption, as the prisoners are lined up facing Warden Norton,
the scoundrel prison administrator outlined his philosophy at
Shawshank:
I am Mr. Norton, the warden. You are sinners
and scum, that's why they sent you to me. Rule
number one: no blaspheming. I'll not have the
Lord's name taken in vain in my prison. The
other rules you'll figure out as you go along ...
. I believe in two things. Discipline and the
Bible. Here, you'll receive both. Put your faith
in the Lord. Your ass belongs to me. Welcome
to Shawshank.'
As wards of the Maine correctional system, the prisoners' actions
were subject to the dictates of Warden Norton and his
administration.2 Every amenity and privilege Shawshank afforded
the inmates would be prison issue, including their religious practices
as evidenced by the Bibles thrust upon them.' Given the
complexities of prison administration, prison officials may
constitutionally make some regulations that would be unacceptable

* Juris Doctor Candidate, University of North Carolina School of Law,
2014. A special thanks to all the educators that have taught and inspired me,
most especially Butch and Letha Ricks.
1. FRANK DARABONT & STEPHEN KING, THE SHAWSHANK REDEMPTION
sc. 14 (1994), availableat http://www.scifiscripts.com/msol/Shaw/scenes_11.
htm.
2. Id.
3. Id.
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in almost any other context. But should a prison's penological
interests allow the prison administration to define a prisoner's
religion for them in a manner analogous to Warden Norton's
prison-issue Bible?
While prisoners may "exist in a shadow world that only
dimly enters our awareness," they still have rights based on societal
expectations at large.5 Ultimately, "the society that these prisoners
inhabit is our own,"6 and religious rights are some of society's most
precious civil liberties.! Many feel the government should not be
able to inhibit the religious practices by unreasonably regulating
spiritual practice or imposing a government endorsed version of
religion. Prisoners have the same desire; however, their right to
exercise their faith is understandably curtailed in the prison
context. At the same time, however, prison walls are not a
"barrier" to the Constitution.' Prisoners are still entitled to some
constitutionally recognized protection of their religious practices,
and some inherently unconstitutional government actions are
unacceptable even in the prison context.
Prisons must balance their penological objectives with the
religious rights still available to prisoners during their
incarceration." In addition to the Constitution, prisons are bound
4. See O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 354-55 (1987)
(Brennan, J., dissenting) ("'[P]rison is a complex of physical arrangements and
of measures . .. which determine the total existence of certain human beings
(except perhaps in the realm of the spirit, and inevitably there as well) from
sundown to sundown, sleeping, waking, speaking, silent, working, playing,
viewing, eating, voiding, reading, alone, with others."' (quoting Morales v.
Schmidt, 340 F. Supp. 544, 550 (W.D. Wis. 1972))).
5. Id. at 354.
6. Id. at 355.
7. See Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 603 (1961) ("The freedom to
hold religious beliefs and opinions is absolute.").
8. See O'Lone, 482 U.S. at 348.
9. See Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126, 137-38 (2003) (Stevens, J.,
concurring).
10. See O'Lone, 482 U.S. at 348.
11. See id. at 355-56 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("Prison officials have the
difficult and often thankless job of preserving security in a potentially
explosive setting, as well as of attempting to provide rehabilitation that
prepares some inmates for re-entry into the social mainstream.").
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by the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act
(RLUIPA),12 which may require the prison to give additional
consideration to a prisoner's religious rights." Under RLUIPA,
when an inmate claims that a prison regulation imposes a
"substantial burden" on a religious exercise, the prison must show
that the regulation advances a "compelling governmental interest"
and the regulation is the "least restrictive means of furthering that
compelling governmental interest."l 4
In order to overcome this strict scrutiny standard imposed
by RLUIPA, some prisons have found it advantageous to make
their own doctrinal determinations regarding inmates' requested
religious observances." First, the prison analyzes and defines what
constitutes an acceptable practice within the asserted religion.
Based on this determination, the prison then rules that the prisoner
is not entitled to a religious liberty because the requested liberty is
not part of the asserted religion." While this approach may be
convenient for prison administrators, it violates the First
Amendment's Establishment Clause.' 8
This Note asserts that the Establishment Clause forbids
government entities from basing their decisions on their own
interpretation of religious doctrine. As a government entity, prisons
are still subject to this core tenet of the Establishment Clause
despite their peonological interests. Accordingly, prisons that deny
a religious liberty request based on their own determination of
religious doctrine are violating the Establishment Clause.' 9
As it will be referred to in this Note, the "doctrinal
determination" approach is a convenient way for prisons to manage
the complexities of prison administration and avoid strict scrutiny

12. Pub. L. No. 106-274, 114 Stat. 803 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
H 2000cc to 2000cc-5 (2006)).
13. Koger v. Bryan, 523 F.3d 789, 796 (7th Cir. 2008).
14. Id.

15.
16.
17.
18.
19.

See
See
See
See
See

infra Part V.
infra Part V.A.2.
infra Part V.A.2.
infra Part III, V.A.2.
infra Part III, V.A.2.
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under RLUIPA.2 0 Due to its convenience, prisons will continue to
use the doctrinal determination approach unless they are explicitly
told not to.21 In order to prevent this problem from spreading,
courts should undertake explicit analysis that shows how the
doctrinal determination approach fundamentally conflicts with the
First Amendment. 22
Prisoners' constitutional rights are based on the rights
society holds as a whole, and Part II gives a general overview of the
First Amendment's Religious Clause outside of the prison context.
This Part seeks to establish that while the Free Exercise Clause
does not exempt all religiously motivated conduct from government
control, it violates the Establishment Clause for government
entities to base their decisions on religious doctrine. Part III will
establish that while prison administrators may take actions that
would be questionable under the Free Exercise Clause outside of
the prison context, the Establishment Clause principles that bind
government entities still apply to prisons' management of their
prisoners' religious liberties. Accordingly, the Establishment Clause
forbids prisons from basing their decisions on doctrinal
determinations. Part IV will provide a general overview of
RLUIPA and its policy as applied in the prison context. Part V will
show how RLUIPA's substantial burden test influences prisons to
make doctrinal
determinations.
Because
the doctrinal
determination approach is convenient for prison administration,
this unconstitutional reasoning will persist unless prisons are
explicitly corrected by the courts. Part VI will show how courts can
correct the prisons' unconstitutional reasoning, and will suggest
some approaches for prisons to constitutionally comply with
RLUIPA without excessive sacrifice of their administrative
interests.

20. See infra Part V.
21. See infra Part V.B.1.
22. See infra Part VIA.
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II. THE FIRST AMENDMENT

A. JudicialScrutiny of Government Actions
Courts employ varying levels of scrutiny when they examine
the constitutionality of government actions that affect civil
liberties.23 The amount of scrutiny depends on the civil liberty in
question and the government action taken to restrict that liberty.24
Often, the level of scrutiny the court chooses will determine
whether the government action will be upheld or not2
The most deferential level of scrutiny is the rational basis
test.26 The rational basis test only requires that the government
action be "rationally related to a legitimate state interest." 2 7 A
legitimate interest is one that is simply not "invidious or
irrational."" The challenger has the burden of proving that the
government is seeking to achieve its purpose in an "arbitrary or
irrational way."29 Under rational basis review, the court will give
large deference to the government action, and the challenger is
unlikely to succeed. 0
"Intermediate scrutiny" is a more searching standard than
the rational basis test. Under intermediate scrutiny, the
government bears the burden of proof, and they must show their
action is "substantially related" to achievement of an "important
governmental objective[]." 32

23. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND
POLICIES 539 (Vicki Been et al. eds., 3d ed. 2006).
24. Id. at 539-40.
25. Id. at 540.
26. Id.
27. Pennell v. City of San Jose, 485 U.S. 1, 14 (1988) (quoting New
Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976)).

28. United States R.R. Ret. Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 176 (1980)
(quoting Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535, 549 (1972)).
29. See id. at 176-77.
30. See id.; see also CHEMERINSKY, supra note 23, at 540.
31. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 23, at 540.
32. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976); see also CHEMERINSKY,
supra note 23, at 540-41.
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The most stringent level of scrutiny is "strict scrutiny."
Strict scrutiny limits the types of goals the government can assert to
justify its action.34 In contrast to the rational basis test, the
government bears the burden of proving the "regulation is
necessary to serve a compelling state interest and that it is narrowly
drawn to achieve that end."35 Under strict scrutiny, courts will
employ stringent analysis to the government's goal and methods
used to achieve the goal. When a court employs strict scrutiny, the
government's action is much more likely to be declared
unconstitutional.
The First Amendment protections afforded to religious
liberties are subject to varying levels of scrutiny.38 Religious
practices and beliefs are among society's most cherished civil
liberties. The First Amendments protects religious liberties through
its two clauses: the Free Exercise Clause and the Establishment
Clause.39 The circumstances surrounding the government's action
and the clause at issue in the claim determine whether the court will
employ deferential or strict scrutiny."
B. Free Exercise Clause
The Free Exercise Clause states that "Congress shall make
no law . .. prohibiting the free exercise [of religion]." 4' In 1940, the
Supreme Court applied-or incorporated -the Free Exercise
Clause to the states in Cantwell v. Connecticut.42 In addition to
33. CHEMERINSKY,supra note 23, at 541-42.
34. See e.g., Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 274 (1986)
(plurality) (ruling that "providing minority role models for . . . minority
students" was not a compelling state interest).
35. Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 198 (1992) (citations omitted)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
36. See infra note 39.
37. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 23, at 542.
38. See infra Parts II.B-C.
39. CHEMERINSKY,supra note 23, at 1181-83.
40. See infra Parts II B-C, III.
41. U.S. CONsT. amend. I.
42. 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940); see also CHEMERINSKY, supra note 23, at
1182.
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violations through legislation, a state can violate the Free Exercise
Clause by compelling the exercise of religion through a government
entity. For example, in School District of Abington Township v.
Schempp,43 the Court ruled that compelling a student to participate
in a school prayer violated the Free Exercise Clause."
In order to be protected under the First Amendment, the
particular practice or observance must be religious and sincere. At
the same time, because "there is no single characteristic or set of
characteristics that all religions have in common that makes them
religions,"4 it is often difficult to determine what beliefs are
entitled to constitutional deference as a religion. 47 The Supreme
Court's reluctance to attempt to define religion is indicative of this
difficulty.48 For example, while atheists do not believe in a god, they
may be entitled to constitutional protections as members of a
religion.49
Despite the lack of a functional definition of religion, "the
Court has made it clear that an individual's sincerely-held religious
belief is protected by the First Amendment even if it is not the
dogma or dominant view within the religion."'o The determination
of whether a belief is sincere is analogous to determining if a person
is acting in good faith.5 ' Additionally, whether a belief is sincere is
not determined by its perceived importance in the context of a
52
particular religion.
43. 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
44. See id. at 222; see also CHEMERINSKY,supra note 23, at 1183.
45. CHEMERINSKY,supra note 23 at 1187, 1189-90.
46. Id. (quoting George C. Freeman, The Misguided Search for the
constitutional Definition of "Religion," 71 GEO. L.J. 1519, 1548 (1983))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Kaufman v. McCaughtry, 419 F.3d 678, 681-82 (7th Cir. 2005) ("A
religion need not be based on a belief in the existence of a supreme being.").
50. CHEMERINSKY,supra note 23, at 1188.
51. See United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 82 (1944) (noting that the
district court correctly instructed the jury that "[tjhe question of the
defendants' good faith is the cardinal question in this case. You are not to be
concerned with the religious belief of the defendants .... ").
52. See Thomas v. Review Bd. of the Ind. Emp't Div., 450 U.S. 707, 715716 (1981).
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The Court outlined the current approach to Free Exercise
cases in Employment Division v. Smith. In Smith, a private
employer terminated the plaintiffs for misconduct due to their use
of peyote, which is a "controlled substance" in Oregon, the state
where the plaintiffs resided. The State denied plaintiffs'
subsequent request for unemployment benefits because of the
general law forbidding giving benefits to people dismissed for
misconduct.'5 However, the plaintiffs sought to compel the State to
pay them unemployment benefits, arguing their use of peyote was
compelled by their religion. 56 In other words, plaintiffs sought an
exception from the general law forbidding the payment of
unemployment benefits to those dismissed for misconduct.5 7
Smith ruled that the Free Exercise Clause protects the
freedom to believe and the freedom to act. The freedom to
believe is protected absolutely." For example, "[t]he government
may not compel affirmation of religious belief, . . . punish the
expression of religious doctrines it believes to be false, . . . [or]

impose special disabilities on the basis of religious views or religious
status . . . ."6 The Court recognized that the freedom to believe

entails some action and ruled that it would be unconstitutional for a
state to ban certain actions solely because they are motivated by
religious beliefs.6 ' For example, "[ilt would doubtless be
unconstitutional .. . to ban the casting of statues that are to be used

for worship purposes or to prohibit bowing down before a golden
calf." 62
Unless a law represents an attempt to "regulate religious
beliefs, the communication of religious beliefs, or the raising of
one's children in those beliefs," the rational basis test applies to a
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.

494 U.S. 872 (1990).
Id. at 874.
Id.
Id. The plaintiffs were members of the Native American Church. Id.
See id. at 878.
See id. at 877.
See Emp't Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 877 (1990).
Id. (internal citations omitted).
See id. at 877-78.
Id. (internal quotations marks omitted).
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Free Exercise Claim.6 ' The Smith Court ruled that "an individual's
religious beliefs [do not] excuse him from compliance with an
otherwise valid law prohibiting conduct that the State is free to
regulate."64 For example, the government is within its right to
collect a general tax.6 If someone adheres to a religion that
prohibits paying taxes to an organized government, the Free
Exercise Clause does not provide an exemption for that person to
avoid paying the tax general tax. 6 The government was within its
right to levy the general tax, and the person's religious liberty
interest does not afford them a specific exception to not comply
with a valid law of general applicability.67 Accordingly, as long as
there is a rational basis for the government action, the fact that it
affects a religious practice does not invoke heightened scrutiny.68
When a government action affects a religious practice,
however, its validity depends upon the practical, secular
justifications for the action and not religious doctrine.69 Smith ruled
that Oregon law was not an attempt to regulate religious beliefs,
and so applied rational basis review. 70 The Court found that
Oregon's peyote ban was based on the rational justification of
prohibiting the general public form using harmful drugs. 7 ' Further,
there was a rational connection to Oregon's justification and the
denial of unemployment benefits to those who were dismissed for
72
the use of controlled substances, and the plaintiffs were not
entitled to an exception based purely on their religious beliefs."
Indicative of how a government entity should treat religious
doctrine in reaching a decision, the Court simply noted what

63. Id. at 882.

64. Id. at 878-79.
65. Id. at 878.
66. Id.
67. See id.

68. See supra notes 59-67.
69. See infra notes 70-74.
70. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 882-83.
71. See id. at 882.

72. See id. at 883.
73. See id.
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religion the plaintiffs' practiced, and its doctrine played no part in
the Court's reasoning.74
C. The Establishment Clause
The Establishment Clause states that "Congress shall make
no law respecting an establishment of religion."75 In 1947, the Court
applied the Establishment Clause to the states in Everson v. Board
of Education.76 In addition to passing legislation that recognizes an
official religion, a state government can take an action that violates
the Establishment Clause. For example, in Santa Fe Independent
School District v. Doe, the Court held that it was unconstitutional
for a high school to facilitate a student lead prayer before a football
game because the prayer tended to separate nonadherants from the
political community.n Additionally, a government can violate the
Free Exercise and Establishment Clause by mandating a religious
practice. This was the case in School Districtof Abington Township

v. Schempp, where a mandated school prayer prevented a
nonadherent from adhering to religion according to their own
conscience in a violation of the Free Exercise Clause, and it
simultaneously established a state view of religion in violation of
the Establishment Clause.
There are three main approaches to the Establishment
79
Clause. The first approach is known as "strict separation"a and it
is synonymous with the colloquial phrase separation "between
74. Id. at 874, 878-80.
75. U.S. CONST. amend. 1.
76. 330 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1947).
77. 530 U.S. 290, 296-97, 320 (2000) (quoting Lynch v. Donnelly, 465
U.S. 668, 688 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("School sponsorship of a
religious message is impermissible because it sends the ancillary message to
members of the audience who are nonadherants that 'they are outsiders, not
full members of the political community, and an accompanying message to
adherants that they are insiders, favored members of the political
community."')); see also CHEMERINSKY,supra note 23, at 1219.
78. Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 223, 226
(1963).
79. CHEMERINSKY,supra note 23, at 1192.
80. Id.
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church and state."' Strict separation seeks to preserve religious
liberty by forbidding government from comingling with religion
entirely.8 The second major approach is the "neutrality theory,"
which states that "government cannot favor religion over
secularism or one religion over others."8 In explaining the
neutrality theory, one scholar states that "the religion clauses
require government to minimize the extent to which it either
encourages or discourages religious belief or disbelief, practice or
nonpractice, observance or nonobservance."8 The third major
approach is the "accommodation" approach.85 Under this approach,
the Court more fully recognizes the important role religion plays in
society." The government only "violates the establishment clause . .
if it literally establishes a church, coerces religious participation, or
favors one religion over others."87
If there is no clear facial violation by law or government
action, courts often apply the Establishment Clause test put forth in
Lemon v. Kurtzman.m The Lemon test seeks to guard against "the
three main evils against which the Establishment Clause was
intended to afford protection: 'sponsorship, financial support, and
active involvement of the sovereign in religious activity."' 89
81. Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 18 (1947) ("The First
Amendment has erected a wall between church and state. That wall must be
kept high and impregnable.").
82. See id. at 31-32 (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
83. CHEMERINSKY,supra note 23, at 1193.
84. Id. (quoting Douglas Laycock, Formal, Substantive, and
Disaggregated Neutrality Toward Religion, 39 DEPAUL L. REv. 993, 1001
(1990)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
85. Id. at 1196.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. 403 U.S. 602 (1971); CHEMERINSKY, supra note 23, at 1202. But see
Lamb's Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 398-99
(1993) (Scalia, J., concurring) (describing the Lemon test as "some ghoul in a
late-night horror movie that repeatedly sits up in its grave and shuffles abroad,

after being repeatedly killed and buried.... When we wish to strike down a
practice it forbids, we invoke it,

. .

. when we wish to uphold a practice it

forbids, we ignore it entirely").
89. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612 (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664,
668 (1970)).
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Accordingly, Lemon employs a three-prong test." "First, the statute
must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its principal or
primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits
religion; finally, the statute must not foster 'an excessive
government entanglement with religion."' 9 1
Among the most fundamental notions embodied in the
Establishment Clause is that the government is not an authority on
religious doctrine. 92 Government involvement with religious
doctrine has resulted in strife and persecution throughout history.93
This notion is embedded in the history of religious conflict that
inspired the drafters of the Establishment Clause. 94 As the Court
noted in United States v. Ballard,5 "[t]he Fathers of the
Constitution were not unaware of the varied and extreme views or
religious sects, of the violence of disagreement among them, and of
the lack of any one religious creed on which all men would agree." 6
Rather than risk the strife that plagues society by having
government base its decisions on religious doctrine, the
Establishment Clause provides that government mandates should
be based on secular factors.
Government decisions based on religious doctrine are
unconstitutional under the Establishment Clause. For example, in
Thomas v. Review Board of the Indiana Employment Security
Division,9 7 the plaintiff asserted that his religion forbid him from
working on an assembly line that made munitions, and his
employment was subsequently terminated after he could not be
accommodated within the company.9 8 Under Indiana employment
law, a person is not entitled to unemployment benefits if they are

90. Id.
91. Id.at 612-13 (quoting Walz, 397 U.S. at 674).
92. See United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 87 (1944) (ruling that the
"Fathers of the Constitution" sought to craft a government where "[m]an's
relation to his God was made no concern of the state").
93. Everson, 330 U.S. 1, 9 (1947).
94. Id. at 10.
95. 322 U.S. 78 (1944).
96. Id. at 87.
97. 450 U.S. 707 (1981).
98. Id. at 709.
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forced to leave due to their voluntary actions. 99 However, the
plaintiff felt an exception should be made because his
unemployment was compelled by his religious beliefs."' While the
Supreme Court held that the government could give deference to
the plaintiff's religiously motivated conduct, the Court ruled that
whether the plaintiff's conduct was supported by his religion's
doctrine was an irrelevant consideration for the government. 0
Even when the government provides special considerations
for religious beliefs, the government may not base its decision on
what is acceptable under the religion's doctrine. For example, in
Frazee v. Illinois Department of Employment Security,"" the
plaintiff's employment was terminated because he refused to work
on the "the Lord's day," and he was subsequently denied
unemployment benefits.103 Under Illinois employment law, a person
may leave their job due to their religious convictions and still
receive unemployment benefits.'t ' However, the Illinois
Department of Employment Security determined the plaintiff was
not entitled to unemployment benefits because his claim was not
supported by his religion's doctrine. 05 The Court ruled that it was
"erroneous" for the government to base its determination on
religious doctrine, and held that the government could only inquire
into whether the plaintiff's beliefs were sincere.
If a government entity is allowed to make individualized
determinations of religious doctrine, a court reviewing the entity's
decision will inevitably have to make a determination on the
doctrine.10' For example, in Ballard, the defendants were indicted
99. See id. at 711-12.
100. Id. at 710-12.
101. See id. at 715-16.
102. 489 U.S. 829 (1989).
103. Id. at 830.
104. See id.
105. Id. at 830-31.
106. Id. at 834-35.
107. See Thomas v. Review Bd. of the Ind. Emp't Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707,
715-16 (1981) (ruling that the trial court gave inappropriate consideration to
what was "scripturally acceptable"); United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 87
(1944) (ruling that, if a trier of fact is forced to consider religious doctrine,
they are entering a "forbidden domain").
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with eighteen counts of mail fraud after they solicited funds for the
"I Am movement."' The defendants asserted that they had, "by
reason of supernatural attainments, the power to heal persons of
ailments and diseases and to make well persons afflicted with any
diseases, injuries, or ailments."'0 The main issue was whether or
not the jury should have been allowed to consider the truth of
defendants' beliefs.o Ultimately, the Ballard Court ruled that the
issue of the defendants' good faith could be submitted to the jury,
but that the actual truth of what they believed was off limits for a
court, as a government entity, to consider."'
If a government entity bases its decision on a religion's
doctrine, the entity violates the Establishment Clause." 2 Ballard
recognized that, if the validity of the defendants' religious beliefs
was submitted to the jury, the Court would rule on whether a
practice is acceptable in light of a particular religion's doctrine."' In
effect, a court would be deciding whether or not the individual
requesting a religious observance is a heretic."'4 However, as the
Court noted, "[h]eresy trials are foreign to our Constitution.'
Allowing government entities to define religious doctrine in order

108. Ballard, 322 U.S. at 79 (1944).
109. Id. at 80.
110. Id. at 85-86.
111. Id. at 86.
112. See infra notes 113-16.
113. See Ballard, 322 U.S. at 86-87.
114. See id.; see also THE NEW SHORTER OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY
1223 (3d. ed. 1993) (defining "heretic" as "1 A person who holds an opinion or
a doctrine contrary to the orthodox doctrine of the Christian Church.... 2 A
person who holds an opinion or a doctrine contrary to the accepted doctrine of
any subject").
115. Ballard, 322 U.S. at 86 (noting that individuals may make whatever
assumptions about religion that they want, but these assumptions are no
concern of the court. "[W]e do not agree that the truth or verity of
respondents' religious doctrines or beliefs should have been submitted to the
jury.")); Grayson v. Schuler, 666 F.3d 450, 453-54 (7th Cir. 2012) (ruling that a
prison cannot base its ruling on what it determines to be an official
requirement of a religion).
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to justify a government's action is contrary to fundamental notions
embodied in the Establishment Clause.' 16
III. THE FIRST AMENDMENT INSIDE THE PRISON CONTEXT
A. The Free Exercise Clause Inside the Prison Context

1. The Turner Standard and its Principles
Whether a prisoner's religious practices are protected under
the Free Exercise Clause is determined by applying the balancing
test outlined in Turner v. Safley."' The plaintiffs in Turner were a
male and female, incarcerated in the same prison, who wanted to
get married and correspond through the prison's mail system."" The
plaintiffs brought suit after the prison determined that allowing
them to correspond or marry while in prison posed too great a
safety risk."'9 Turner sought to create a standard that acknowledged
prisoners' rights without compromising legitimate penological

interest.120
The Turner standard is not one of "heightened scrutiny,"
and it seeks to avoid "subjecting the day-to-day judgments" of
prison officials.12 The Turner analysis does not depend upon an
analysis of any religious doctrine.1 22 Rather, the Turner analysis
requires courts to discern the practical, objective impact an act has
on the prison's penological interests, independent of the tenet's
importance in the context of a religion. 123 Accordingly, the Turner
Court articulated a reasonableness test that considered four factors:
116. See Ballard, 322 U.S. at 87 (noting that the Founding Fathers
refrained from involvement with religious dogma).
117. 482 U.S. 78 (1987).
118. Id. at 81-82.
119. Id. at 91-92, 97.
120. See id. at 89-90.
121. Id. at 86-87 ("In none of these four 'prisoners' rights' cases did the
Court apply a standard of heightened scrutiny. . . .").
122. See infra notes 123-24 and accompanying text
123. See Turner v. Safely, 482 U.S. 78, 86-89 (1987) (referencing
decisions where prison regulations were based on a connection to an apparent
penological interest).
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(1) whether there is a "'valid, rational connection' between the
prison regulation and the legitimate governmental interest put
forward to justify it;" (2) whether there were other reasonable
means available for the prisoner to exercise the right; (3) whether
affording the right will have an impact on prison administration;
and (4) whether courts should take note that the absence of readily
available alternatives should serve as evidence that a prison's

decision was reasonable.12 4
2. The Turner Standard's Principles in Application
Outside the prison context, the ways people exercise their
religion are not likely subject to governmental scrutiny because
these exercises are not likely against the law. ' Even
unconventional religious practices will likely remain free from
government regulation in the context of normal society.16 For
example, it is common for Rastafarians to wear dreadlocks.12 1While
this might not be considered a normal, neat, and clean hairstyle,
Rastafarians who exercise their faith in this way will not have their
hair length regulated by the government in a normal context.
However, what is innocuous outside a prison may pose a
threat to the prison's safety and security. 29 The same dreadlock
hairstyle on the street may be constitutionally banned in a prison."3
3
1
The Seventh Circuit addressed this issue in Grayson v. Schuler,1
noting that "a ban on long hair, including dreadlocks, even when
motivated by sincere religious belief, would pass constitutional

124. Id. at 89-91.
125. See O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 354-55 (1987)
(Brennan, J., concurring) (stating "nor have state governments undertaken to
prohibit members of the general adult population from speaking to one
another, wearing beards, embracing their spouses, or corresponding with their
lovers").
126. See id.
127. See Grayson v. Schuler, 666 F.3d 450, 454 (7th Cir. 2012).
128. See id. at 451-52.
129. See infra notes 130-34 and accompanying text.
130. Grayson, 666 F.3d at 452.
131. 666 F.3d 450 (7th Cir. 2012).
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muster"I 32 in the prison context because of the inherent challenges
of prison administration.133 While dreadlocks may be harmless
outside the prison context, inside the prison context "prison
officials might fear that a shank or other contraband could be
concealed in an inmate's dreadlocks, or . .. they might want inmates

to wear their hair short because inmates with long hair can more
easily change their appearance, should they escape, by cutting their
hair."
A prison can permissibly regulate religious conduct
provided that it does so based on secular, objective factors.13 While
Grayson did not explicitly apply Turner factor by factor, its
principles are evident in the Seventh Circuit's reasoning. In terms
of the first factor, the Grayson court noted that there was a valid
connection between forbidding long hair and prison security, as
long hair can be used to conceal contraband or a shank. 3 6 In terms
of Turner's second factor, it seems there are few alternatives to
having long hair that would pose a reduced safety threat.3 3 For
example, if a prisoner requested hair extensions similar to
dreadlocks, the hair extensions may still have the "formidable
length and density" that would enable a prisoner to hide
contraband. 13 This is an objective observation that involves no
consideration or scrutiny of religious doctrine. Regarding the third
factor, the court thought that allowing the dreadlocks poses a
burden on prison administration in addition to the safety risk
because dreadlocks make it easier for a prisoner to change his
appearance if he escapes.' 39 Also, long, braided hair presents more
hygiene problems that could require the use of prison resources.

132. Id. at 452.
133. See id. at 452.
134. Id.

135. See infra notes 136-40 and accompanying text.
136. Grayson, 666 F.3d at 452.
137.
138.
139.
140.

See id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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B. The EstablishmentClause Inside the Prison Context
1. Prisons' Duty to Facilitate Prisoners' Religious Observances
Prisoners are wards of the state, 141 and prisons are
responsible for inmates' well-being and rehabilitation.142 Part of this
responsibility entails allowing of some religious liberties in the
prison context. 143 This caretaking function means that a complete
separation of church and state is not entirely feasible in the prison
context.'" For example, tax dollars are used to provide for prison
chaplains, which would be a clear violation of the Establishment
Clause outside of the prison context. 45 As the Court noted in Cutter
v. Wilkinson,'" prisons may afford special privileges for religious

liberties without offending the Constitution.'4 7
"[P]risoners have a constitutional right to participate in
congregate religious services."'48 At times, prisons may consider
religious doctrine in order to accommodate a general religious
observance. For example, in Davenport v. Artus,149 it was not
unconstitutional for a prison to use the date a religious official
suggested for determining when to allow special privileges for a
religious holiday.150 Recognizing a date based on established
religious doctrine as determined by a religious official is a valid way
to afford a religious liberty because the decision is based on when

141. See Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 720-21 (2005) (addressing the
caretaking function of prisons in regards to prisoners' religious liberties).
142. See id.; O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 348 (1987).
143. See Cutter, 544 U.S. at 720-21.
144. See id.
145. See Grayson v. Schuler, 666 F.3d 450, 453-54 (7th Cir. 2012);
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 23, at §12.12.
146. 544 U.S. 709 (2005).
147. Id. at 719-20.
148. Davenport v. Artus, No. 09-CV-875 (TJM/DRH), 2011 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 12505, at *17 (N.D.N.Y. Jan. 10, 2011), affd, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
12497 (N.D. N.Y. Feb. 8,2011).
149. No. 09-CV-875 (TJM/DRH), 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12505
(N.D.N.Y. Jan. 10, 2011), affd, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12497 (N.D.N.Y. Feb. 8,
2011).
150. Id. at *2.
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most adherents in the prison will want to observe the day of
solemnity.' 5 ' The prison is not saying that the holiday should be
celebrated on this day because of their interpretation of a divine
mandate.15 Rather, in line with their duty to provide religious
liberties, the prison is making a logical assumption of how to make
the most efficient use of prison resources and accommodate the
most inmates.153
However, just because a prison accommodates religious
practices in general does not mean it must grant a specific religious
liberty request.154 For example, in Davenport, a prison chaplain
circulated a memo that incorrectly stated the date when the prison
would facilitate a religious festival, and that some inmates were
planning on partaking in the observance.5 The plaintiff wanted to
attend the gathering, but was not allowed to because he had a
conflicting work obligation."' The prison administration denied the
inmate's request to attend another time because the prison planned
to facilitate the festival on a different date and because of the
administrative concerns of allowing the inmate off of his work
station for an unsanctioned event.157 The Davenport court ruled that
while a prisoner is entitled to practice his religion, he is not entitled
to do so completely on his own terms.15 1
A prison's reasoning in these determinations is key in
balancing whether its involvement with religion violates the
Establishment Clause. 59 In reaching its decision, the prison in
Davenport did not say that the prisoner was making an incorrect
interpretation of religious doctrine. 60 Rather, the prison
determined that allowing the inmate to leave his work post would
151. See id. at *17-19 (recognizing that prisons must balance their duty
to preserve a prisoner's religious rights with the restraints of their penological
resources).
152. See id.
153. See id.
154. See infra notes 155-58 and accompanying text.
155. Davenport,2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12505, at *2, 6-8.
156. Id. at *2-4.
157. Id. at *6-8, 19-20.
158. See id. at *20-21.
159. See infra notes 160-62 and accompanying text.
160. Davenport,2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12505, at *20-21.
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unduly compromise prison administration, especially considering
that he would be allowed to celebrate the festival on another
date.'6 ' The prison was not concerned with the correctness of the
date in terms of the religion; the prison was concerned with the
request's objective impact on penological interests that are not
hinged on religious doctrine. 162
2. Doctrinal Determinations and the Establishment Clause
While a prison may be able to regulate religiously motivated
behaviors, it must take care to not make individualized
determinations regarding the prisoner's religion.16 ' For example, in
Grayson, a prisoner requested that he be able to wear dreadlocks,
per his desire to observe the "Nazirite vow of separation" as an
exception to the prison's policy requiring prisoners to have neat
hair.TM While the court acknowledged that the prison could forbid
the prisoner from having long hair, the Seventh Circuit analyzed
165
the prison's method of reasoning with particular care. The court
criticized the prison's approach in concluding that Rastafarians
could wear dreadlocks, but that such a practice was not supported
by the prisoner's religion, the African Hebrew Israelites of
Jerusalem. 166 Accordingly, the Grayson court took exception with
the prison's doctrinal determination in its opinion and ultimately
ruled that the prison violated the prisoner's constitutional rights.
A prison's method of reasoning in denying a prisoner's
request thus determines whether the prison's decision is
constitutional. Neither prisoner in Davenport nor Grayson was
constitutionally entitled to the respective practice they requested.
However, the prison's decision in Davenport was upheld, while the
161. See id. at * 20 (noting that "inmates still retain the right to observe
recognized holidays which appear on the religious calendar").
162. Id.
163. See infra notes 164-67 and accompanying text.
164. Grayson v. Schuler, 666 F.3d 450, 454 (7th Cir. 2012).
165. See id. at 453-54.
166. Id. at 453.
167. See id. at 453-55.
168. See supra notes 155-58, 164-7 and accompanying text.
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prison's determination in Grayson was rejected, due to their
different approaches in reaching their respective determinations. In
Davenport, religious doctrine may have been relevant in choosing
the date to facilitate the religious observance.169 However, the
prison in Davenport did not purport to weigh religious doctrine
when it determined the prisoner could not leave his work station to
observe the religious festival. 70 In Grayson, the prison made an
individualized determination of what practices were supported by
the prisoner's religion.
While the prison's determination in
Davenport was acceptable under the Establishment Clause, the
doctrinal determination based on the prisoner's religion in Grayson
was not.
Thus, when a prison denies a religious request based on a
doctrinal determination, the prison violates the Establishment
Clause.172 For example, in Grayson, the court noted that "[pirison
chaplains may not determine which religious observances are
permissible because [they are] orthodox." 73 The court seemed to
take exception with the way the prison acted as the surrogate
religious official in determining whether the inmate should be
allowed to wear dreadlocks.174 Grayson criticized the prison's
doctrinal determination in several ways.7 7 First, the court noted
that "[t]he prison would be hard pressed to defend a rule that only
Rastafarians may wear dreadlocks . . . unless it were certain that no

other sect, and not even any individual prisoner's private faith,
considers wearing dreadlocks a religious observance."' 7 Second,
the court ruled that regardless of what a religion "officially"
requires, "heresy is not excluded from the protection of the [First
Amendment]." 77 In candid dictum, the Grayson court observed

169. See supra notes 150-53 and accompanying text.
170. See supra notes 160-62 and accompanying text.
171. See supra notes 164-67 and accompanying text.
172. See infra notes 173-78 and accompanying text.
173. Grayson, 666 F.3d at 455 (citing Vinning-El v. Evans, 657 F.3d 591,
595 (7th Cir. 2011).).
174. See id. at 455.
175. Id. at 453-54.
176. Id. at 453.
177. Id. at 454.
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that "the founders of Christianity (Jesus Christ, the Apostles, and
St. Paul) were Jewish heretics; Luther and Calvin and the other
founders of Protestantism were Catholic heretics.",78
3. Doctrinal Determinations and the Lemon Test
The Lemon test is relevant in assessing the constitutionality
of prisons making their determinations based on religious
doctrine." 9 Using religious doctrine to delegitimize an individual's
claim to religious liberty is troubling in light of Lemon's third
prong, which forbids "excessive government entanglement with
religion."..o For example, the court in Grayson appears to recognize

this problem with respect to the discussion of heresy. 8 ' In addition,
Grayson indicates that it would be hard to determine whether a
prisoner should be afforded a religious liberty based on what a
traditional African Hebrew Israelite of Jerusalem should believe,
noting that "African Hebrew Israelites of Jerusalem might well
deem taking the Nazirite vow an appropriate supplemental
observance, and a religious believer who does more than he is
strictly required to do is nevertheless exercising his religion."l 82 On
the other hand, the court stated that it could not base its decision
solely on whether the prisoner's practice were in line with the
religion's other doctrine, noting:
There is more to the Nazirite vow than just not
cutting one's hair, such as not eating or
drinking any grape product or going near dead
bodies, Numbers 6:4-6, and perhaps someone

178. Id.
179. Kaufman v. McCaughtry, 419 F.3d 678, 683 (7th Cir. 2005). See also
Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 668 (2002) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring) (noting that the Lemon test is a "central tool" in Establishment
Clause analysis); COLUMBIA HUMAN RIGHTS LAW REVIEW, A JAILHOUSE
LAWYER'S
MANUAL
Chapter 27 (8th ed. 2009), available at
http://www3.law.columbia.edu/hrlr/JLM/Chapter_27
.pdf.
180. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 613 (1971).
181. See supra notes 177-79 and accompanying text.
182. Grayson, 666 F.3d at 454 (citation omitted).
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who took the vow and let his hair grow but
ignored the other proscriptions could be
thought

insincere - though

. . . a sincere

religious believer doesn't forfeit his religious
rights merely because he is not scrupulous in
his observance; for what would religion be
without its backsliders, penitents, and prodigal
sons?'8 '
This situation could be further complicated if the requested
observance is determined to be impermissible under the asserted
religion, but is justified under another.' In such a situation, the
prison would be making two doctrinal determinations: one for the
religion that allows for the observance, and another for the religion
that does not.8' The prison would then have to pit their two
doctrinal determinations against each other in order to show why
one religion justifies an observance and the other does not support
the observance.'" 6 As the Grayson court noted, "such a rule would
discriminate impermissibly in favor of one religious sect." 187
Additionally, the prisoner is forced to choose between staying with
his current religion or switching his religious affiliation so he can
partake in the requested observance. Even in the prison context,
allowing a government entity to base its decisions regarding
religious liberties on its own doctrinal determination runs afoul of
the Establishment Clause.
IV. RLUIPA
The Court's decision in Employment Division v. Smith

marked a change in Free Exercise jurisprudence that caused public

183. Id.
184. See id. at 453.
185. See id. 454-55 (noting the difficulties of determining whether
something is valid assertion of a religious exercise under one religion but not
another).
186. See id.
187. Id. at 453.
188. See Koger v. Bryan, 523 F.3d 789, 799 (7th Cir. 2008).
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concern.8 Before Smith, the understood standard of review for a
Free Exercise claim was strict scrutiny, as outlined in Sherbert v.
Verner.'9 While Smith ruled that the constitutional standard for
Free Exercise was the rational basis test, it also noted that states
could enhance citizens' religious rights through the political
process.' 9 ' Smith sparked public concern that the government would
unduly interfere with religious liberties.m9
In response to Smith, Congress enacted the Religious
Freedom and Restoration Act (RFRA),'9 which mandated that
courts apply strict scrutiny for all Free Exercise claims.194
Accordingly, RFRA sought to statutorily enforce the former
controlling Free Exercise standard of Sherbert by mandating that
courts apply strict scrutiny when a government action imposes a
substantial burden on a person's religious exercise:
Government shall not substantially burden a
person's exercise of religion even if the burden
results from a rule of general applicability ...
[unless] [the] Government . . . demonstrates

that application of the burden to the person (1) is in furtherance of a compelling
governmental interest; and (2) is the least
restrictive means of furthering that compelling
governmental interest.195
However, in City of Boerne v. Flores,'96 the Court invalidated

RFRA as it applied to states due to what the Court considered an
improper assertion of power under the Fourteenth Amendment. 97
The Boerne Court held that Congress can "enforce" constitutional
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
U.S.C. §§
194.

See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 23, at 1247-48.
See id.; Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
See Emp. Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990).
See 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (2006).
Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488 (codified as amended at 42
2000bb to 2000bb-4 (2006)).
See 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (2006).

195. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb to bb-1 (2006).
196. 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
197. See generally id. (ruling that RFRA is unconstitutional as applied to
the states).
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rights by asserting the Fourteenth Amendment, but it cannot create
new ones." 8 The Court ruled that RFRA purported to create a new
constitutional standard, and it could not be imported on the states
through the Fourteenth Amendment. 99 While RFRA was still valid
against the federal government, citizens still felt their religious
liberties were vulnerable200
In response to Boerne, Congress enacted RLUIPA and
201
made the statute applicable to institutionalized persons.
In
contrast to RFRA, RLUIPA's scope is limited to claims relating to
burdens associated with "land use regulation[s]" 20 2 and "persons
residing in or confined to an institution." 203 Additionally, Congress
asserted its authority to pass the statute by using its power under
the Commerce Clause rather than the Fourteenth Amendment, as
204
it had done when passing RFRA.
Similar to RFRA's use of
Sherbert's standard, RLUIPA requires courts to use strict scrutiny
when a government action imposes "a substantial burden on the
religious exercise" of an incarcerated person:
No Government shall impose a substantial
burden on the religious exercise of a person
residing in or confined to an institution ... even
if the burden results from a rule of general
applicability,
unless
the
government
demonstrates that imposition of the burden on
that person-(1) is in furtherance of a
compelling governmental interest; and (2) is
the least restrictive means of furthering that
compelling governmental interest. 205

198. See Boerne, 521 U.S. at 519-20.
199. See id.
200. Id.
201. See Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 714 (2005) ("RLUIPA is the
latest of long-running congressional efforts to accord religious exercise
heightened protection from government-imposed burdens, consistent with this
Court's precedents.").
202. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc (2006).
203. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1 (2006).
204. See id.
205. Id.
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Congress extended RLUIPA to prisoners in large part because of
the arbitrary way prisons were managing prisoners' religious
practices.2 0 Instances of prisons' capricious decision making were
207
legion across the country. For example, a prison in Ohio refused
to provide a Muslim prisoner with Halal food, despite offering
208
Kosher food.
Prisons in Michigan prohibited the lighting of
Chanukah candles, even though the prison permitted "smoking,
cooking and the lighting of votive candles." 20 9 A priest responsible
for ministering to prisoners in Oklahoma fought with a prison for
nearly a year over whether he could administer a small amount of
sacramental wine to Catholic prisoners.210 Congress felt that in
206. See Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 716 (2005).
207. See infra notes 208-10.
208. Protecting Religious Freedom After Boerne v. Flores: HearingBefore

the H. Comm. On the Judiciary, 105th Cong. 2d Sess., pt. 3, p. 11, n.1 (1998)
[hereinafter Boerne Hearings] (statement of Marc D. Stern, Legal Dir., Am.
Jewish Cong.). "Halal is an Arabic word that literally means 'permissible' or
'lawful.' Conventionally, halal signifies 'pure food' with regard to meat in
particular by proper Islamic practice as ritual slaughter and pork avoidance."
JOHN FISHCER, THE HALAL FRONTIER: MUSLIM CONSUMERS IN A
GLOBALIZED MARKET 1 (1st ed. 2011). The prison was able to maintain this
position because they claimed that Halal food was unavailable, there was one
firm that produced both Kosher and Halal food. Boerne Hearings, supra at 11
n.1. The committee reports indicate that the prison's decision was not fair and
it "should have been different." Id.
209. Boerne Hearings, supra note 208, at 41 (statement of Issac M.

Jaroslawicz, Dir. Of Legal Affairs for the Aleph Institute). The candles on the
menorah are "connected to light, which dominates Jewish symbolism as the
"Lamp of God', the divine light . . . ." Rachel Hachilili, The Menorah, The

Ancient Seven-Armed Candelabrum: Origin, Form , and Significance 206
(John J. Collins et al. eds., 1st ed. 2001). Given that the prison allowed inmates
to maintain other sources of fire, it curiously maintained the reason it forbid
the lighting of Chanukah candles fire safety. Boerne Hearings,supra note 208,
at 41. According to the committee report, "officials insisted on enforcing the
ban even after some good-hearted institutional fire marshals offered to stand
over the communal menorahs with fire extinguishers for the 40 minutes that
the candles would burn." Id.
210. Boerne Hearings,supra note 208, at 58-59 (statement of Donald W.
Brooks, Reverend, Diocese of Tulsa, Okla.). Many adherent to the
Catholicism believe that the sacramental wine literally becomes the blood of
Jesus Christ. See Bishop's Committee, The New Catholic Answer Bible T-1
(Louis F. Hartman, et al. eds., 1st ed. 2005).
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addition to the deferential Turner standard, more oversight was
needed to avoid these erratic determinations regarding prisoners'
*211
religious liberties.
Under RLUIPA, prison administrators must give special
attention to prisoners' religious rights, 2 12 as RLUIPA states no
government regulation shall impose "a substantial burden on the
religious exercise of a person" unless the regulation is "in
furtherance of a compelling governmental interest" and "is the least
restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental
interest." 213 Thus, if courts determine that a substantial burden
exists, then RLUIPA requires courts to evaluate the prison's
regulation under the strict scrutiny standard.214
The statute was challenged in Cutter v. Wilkinson, and the
Court ruled that, on its face, RLUIPA does not violate the
Establishment Clause.21 The prisoner-plaintiffs sought redress
under RLUIPA due to what they perceived as the prison
unjustifiably placing a substantial burden on their various
"nonmainstream" religious practices. 2 16 The prison responded by
saying that RLUIPA violated the Establishment Clause by
improperly advancing religion.2 17 The Cutter Court ruled that just
because a consideration is given to religious freedoms does not
mean there is a constitutional requirement to give special
consideration to secular freedoms as well.218 RLUIPA mandates

211. See Cutter, 544 U.S. at 716-17, 720-21.
212. See Koger v. Bryan, 523 F.3d 789, 796 (7th Cir. 2008).
213. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc (2006).
214. See Cutter, 544 U.S. at 717.
215. Id. at 714, 721 (2005) ("RLUIPA thus protects institutionalized
persons who are unable freely to attend to their religious needs and are
therefore dependent on the government's permission and accommodation for
exercise of their religion.").
216. Id. at 712-13.
217. Id. at 713.
218. Id. at 724 (citing Corp. of Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus
Christ of Latter- Day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 338 (1987)) ("Religious
accommodations . . . need not 'come packaged with benefits to secular

entities."'); Madison v. Riter, 355 F.3d 310, 318 (4th Cir. 2003) ("There is no
requirement that legislative protections for fundamental rights march in
lockstep.")).
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that its policies be enforced neutrally. 219 RLUIPA imposes no
affirmative duty to facilitate or subsidize religion, 22 0 and prisons are
still allowed to consider legitimate penological interests. 221
Despite the Cutter Court's ruling that RLUIPA does not
violate the Establishment Clause, whether RLUIPA will persist is
still not entirely clear. As noted above, the real issue with a federal
statutory enhancement of religious liberties is how Congress
asserted its authority to pass the statute in the first place. 222
However, Cutter only granted certiorari on the RLUIPA
Establishment Clause issue and did not address whether RLUIPA
is a permissible assertion of Congress' power under the Commerce
Clause.223 Accordingly, it is not guaranteed that RLUIPA will
survive a challenge to Congress' authority in enacting the law.224
V. ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE ISSUES WITH PRISONS' APPLICATION
OF RLUIPA

A. How RLUIPA's SubstantialBurden Test Influences Prisonsto
Make DoctrinalDeterminationsin Violation of the
EstablishmentClause
1. Substantial Burden Analysis Under RLUIPA
RLUIPA does not provide an express definition for what
constitutes a "substantial burden."2 Courts have described
substantial burden in many ways. A substantial burden could be
something that imposes "significant pressure which directly coerces
219. Cutter, 544 U.S. at 720 (citing Bd. of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Sch. Dist.
v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 704 (1994)).
220. Mayweathers v. Newland, 314 F.3d 1062,1068-69 (9th Cir. 2002).
221. See Cutter, 544 U.S. at 722 ("We do not read RLUIPA to elevate
accommodation of religious observances over an institution's need to maintain
order and safety.").
222. See supra notes 197-201 and accompanying text.
223. Cutter, 544 U.S. at 718.
224. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 23, at 1265; see also Sara Smolik,
Note, The Utility and Efficacy of the RLUIPA: Was it a Waste?, 31 B.C.
ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 723,731-35 (2004).

225. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-5 (2006).
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the religious adherent to conform his or her behavior
accordingly." 2 6 A substantial burden could also be as strict a
standard as having to demonstrate that the prison regulation made
a sincerely
regarded
religious
observance
"effectively
2 27
the
substantial
burden
test
"[A]t a minimum
impracticable."
requires that a RLUIPA plaintiff demonstrate that the
government's denial of a particular religious item or observance
was more than an inconvenience to one's religious practice."228
In a RLUIPA claim, whether a court will uphold a prison's
action largely depends on whether the action is found to constitute
a substantial burden, because that determines whether strict
scrutiny will be applied. 229 An example of the outcome
determinative nature of this decision is Benning v. Georgia,m'
where the prison had a grooming policy that barred prisoners from
having facial hair or long sideburns. 23 The prison also had a policy
of not providing for religious materials, but allowing prisoners to
have them if the materials were purchased by the prisoner or
donated.2 2 Ralph Benning, the prisoner and an adherent to
Judaism, grew earlocks and facial hair in accordance with what he
asserted were the tenets of Torah-Observant Judaism. 233 Benning
requested that he be allowed to keep his earlocks without cutting
them. 234 Additionally, Benning requested a depilatory because he
claimed it was the only way he could remove his beard without
offending his religion. 235 Each of Benning's requests were denied,
and Benning filed suit claiming that requiring him to remove his

226. Smith v. Allen, 502 F.3d 1255, 1277 (11th Cir. 2007) (quoting
Midrash Sephardi, Inc. v. Town of Surfside, 366 F.3d 1214, 1227 (11th Cir.
2004)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
227. Koger v. Bryan, 523 F.3d 789, 799 (7th Cir. 2008).
228. Smith, 502 F.3d at 1278 (citing Midrash, 366 F.3d at1227).
229. See infra notes 230-37 and accompanying text.
230. 845 F. Supp. 2d 1372 (M.D. Ga. 2012).
231. Id. at 1374-75,
232. Id. at 1380-81.
233. Id.
234. Id. at 1375.
235. Id. at 1374.
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earlocks and to spend his own money for a depilatory substantially
burdened his religious observance under RLUIPA.m
The District Court for the Middle District of Georgia found
that denying Benning's request to keep his earlocks constituted a
substantial burden. 237 The court then applied a precise analysis to
the prison's regulation, noting that the point of disagreement was
"the area between the bottom of Benning's ear canal and the
bottom of his ear lobe, an area estimated ... to be less than one half
inch in length." 23 8 The court acknowledged that the prison asserted
"several compelling interests" for not allowing the earlocks,
including safety and security, and hygiene. 239 However, the court
went on to criticize the imprecise way the prison applied its policy
to Benning's circumstances, noting that the prison failed to offer a
"sufficient basis to justify their concern that [the prison's] interests
will be compromised if they accommodate Benning's request." 240 In
contrast to the earlock request, the court found that the prison's
decision to deny the depilatory request did not constitute a
substantial burden because there was evidence that Benning could
afford the depilatory and he was not otherwise denied a reasonable
* * 241
opportunity to practice his religion.
Accordingly, the prison was
242
awarded summary judgment on the depilatory issue.
Given the similarity between the two prison regulations, it
seems that both of Benning's claims should have reached the same
outcome in terms of the regulation's impact on Benning's religious
practice.243 Both requests involved the same grooming policy and
facial hair.244 The denial of the requests was based on the same
justifications for the same prisoner.245 However, the court felt

236.
237.
238.
239.
240.
241.
242.
243.
244.
245.

Id.
Id. at 1381.
Id. at 1382.
Id.
Id. at 1384.
Id. at 1381.
Id.
See infra notes 245, 247 and accompanying text.
See Benning, 845 F. Supp. 2d at 1374.
See id. at 1374-75.
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persuaded by an Eight Circuit case246 that stood for the notion that
requiring prisoners to finance their own religious practices did not
constitute a substantial burden.2 47 Despite the Benning Court's
reliance on precedent, the outcome of the case still seems curious.
The reasoning in Benning shows that there is no clear
standard for what constitutes a substantial burden under
RLUIPA. 248 Despite holding that Benning's depilatory claim
constituted a substantial burden, the court acknowledged that the
outcome could have been different in another jurisdiction.249 In
contrast to a Tenth Circuit ruling, 250 the court felt that Benning had
sufficient financial resources to pay for the depilatory, so the
prison's stance on the depilatory did not constitute a substantial
burden. 251' As demonstrated by the Benning decision, there is no
clear standard as to what specific factors will or will not be
persuasive in a RLUIPA substantial burden determination. 252 With
no clear indication of what a court will find persuasive, prisons will
look for any means they can to disprove the presence of a
substantial burden.

246. Patel v. U.S. Bureau of Prisons, 515 F.3d 807 (8th Cir. 2008).
247, See Benning, 845 F. Supp. 2d at 1381 (citing Patel, 515 F.3d at 814).
In Patel, the Eighth Circuit ruled that requiring a prisoner to pay for meals
that complied with his religion's tenets did not constitute a substantial burden
under RLUIPA. Patel,515 F.3d at 814.
248. See infra notes 249-53 and accompanying text.
249. Benning, 845 F. Supp. 2d at 1381.
250. Abdulhaseeb v. Calbone, 600 F.3d 1301, 1317-18 (10th Cir. 2010).
The court in Abdulhaseeb ruled that an indigent plaintiff did not have to
exhaust all available means of practicing his religion before he could assert
that a prison's refusal to provide him with kosher food constituted a
substantial burden. Id.
251. Benning, 845 F. Supp. 2d at 1381.
252. See supra notes 249-52 and accompanying text.
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2. Prisons' Doctrinal Determinations in Negating the Presence of a
Substantial Burden
a. RL UIPA and Doctrinal Determinations
A strict textual reading of RLUIPA seems to suggest room
for prisons to weigh in on whether there is a substantial burden.253
RLUIPA protects a sincere religious exercise regardless of whether
it is "compelled by, or central to, a system of religious belief." 25 4
Yet, it seems that some religious justification will be necessary to
prove the prison regulation poses something more than an
"inconvenience." 255 While RLUIPA states that it is the plaintiff's
burden to prove there is a substantial burden, nothing in RLUIPA's
text provides strict rules for determining if a substantial burden
exists.2s6 Furthermore, RLUIPA does not explicitly prevent a prison
from providing input on whether its regulation imposes a
substantial burden on a specific prisoner's religion.257 Accordingly,
there is no explicit impediment under RLUIPA that prevents a
prison from determining what religious practices are worthy of
deference under RLUIPA.
By making an individualized doctrinal determination, a
prison can negate the assertion that its regulation imposes a
substantial burden.28 RLUIPA requires that the requested exercise
be religiously motivated. 259 By making a determination that the
prisoner is not an official adherent to a particular religion or that
the asserted religion does not entail the requested exercise, the
prison can thus determine that the religious justification is
253. See infra notes 255-58 and accompanying text.
254. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-5(7)(A) (2006).
255. See supra note 228 and accompanying text.
256. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc-1 to -5 (2006) ("[Tjhe plaintiff shall bear the
burden of persuasion on whether the law (including a regulation) or
government practice that is challenged by the claim substantially burdens the
plaintiff's exercise of religion.").
257. See id. The statue notes that "the government shall bear the burden
of persuasion on any element of the claim" except for the substantial burden
analysis. Id.
258. See infra notes 259-62 and accompanying text.
259. Benning v. Georgia, 845 F. Supp. 2d 1372, 1377 (M.D. Ga. 2012).
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tenuous.'60 The hope is that if the prison can establish that the
religious justification is tenuous, a court will be less likely to see this
burden as substantial.261 However, as noted above, this approach
raises serious questions regarding the Establishment Clause. 62
By itself, the strict text of RLUIPA is not enough to deter
prisons from making doctrinal determinations in order to negate
the presence of a substantial burden.2 63 There is no clear definition
of substantial burden in RLUIPA or the existing caselaw.264 As with
many case-by-case determinations, different factors may be more
persuasive to different courts in the course of a substantial burden
analysis.265 However, the key element in any substantial burden
determination is the prison regulations effect on the prisoner's
religious exercise,'26 6 and there is nothing in RLUIPA that prevents
a prison from having input in this determination. Establishment
Clause issues notwithstanding, prisons will primarily look for ways
to refute the presence of a substantial burden, and in strict terms of
RLUIPA, making a doctrinal determination seems to be a viable
approach.267 In order to prevent the use of such unconstitutional
reasoning by prisons, courts need to make explicit reference to the
Establishment Clause issues from making doctrinal determination.
b. The DoctrinalDeterminationApproach and SubstantialBurden
Analysis

In seeking to comply with RLUIPA, the prison in Benning
261
In denying
adopted the doctrinal determination approach.
on
a rabbi's
the
prison
relied
Benning's request for a depilatory,
interpretation for what it takes to officially become Jewish. In
260. See id. at 1377-78.
261.
262.
263.
264.
265.
266.

See id.
See supra Part III.B.
See infra notes 266-68 and accompanying text.
See supra Part V.A.1.
See supra notes 249-52 and accompanying text.
42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1 (2006).

267. See supra notes 254-261 and accompanying text.
268. Benning v. Georgia, 845 F. Supp. 2d 1372, 1372 (M.D. Ga. 2012).
269. Id. at 1377-78.
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order for Benning to be entitled to religious privliges as a Jew, the
prison determined that he must either be born Jewish or go through
a "formal conversion process." 2 70 The prison justified their
conclusion that Benning could not be Jewish by presenting a record
of Benning's family history and citing Benning's admission that he
had not gone through a formal conversion process.21 Further, the
prison asserted that requiring Benning to cut his earlocks did not
constitute a substantial burden because he could "practice his

religion in other ways." 272
The prison's use of the rabbi's interpretation and Benning's
genealogy offends fundamental notions of the Establishment
Clause.' The prison, as a government institution, based its decision
on a religious official's opinion274 to determine who could be Jewish
and who could not.275 The prison made a determination based on
religious doctrine by saying that Benning could not be Jewish unless
he complied with the view established by the prison via the rabbi.276
In other words, Benning could not be Jewish unless he complied
with the prison's view of what it takes to become a Jew.
The court in Benning did not address the fundamental
problems with the prison's approach to Benning's request.278 The
court correctly noted that the law will recognize someone's faith as
sincere even if they do not take a conventional approach to their
respective religion.279 Although the prison's approach seems to be
fundamentally wrong, the court describes it simply as
"misplaced."280 As noted above, the prison's approach was more

270. Id. at 1378.
271. Id. Benning's mother was Jewish by birth, but she practice
Christianity. Id.
272. Id. at 1380.
273. See infra notes 274-78 and accompanying text.
274. Benning, 845 F. Supp. 2d at 1378.
275. See id.
276. See id.
277. See id.
278. See infra notes 279-89 and accompanying text.
279. Benning, 85 F. Supp. 2d at 1377-78.
280. Id. at 1378; see supra notes 269-78 and accompanying text.
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than "misplaced,"281 it was an affront to core constitutional
principles embodied in the Establishment Clause.
Prisons often look to courts to determine the approach they
should take with their regulations, and given their administrative
concerns, prisons will adopt procedures to the extent the law
allows. For example, in Benning, the prison's interpretation of
caselaw appears to have driven its belief that its position on
Benning's earlock request was permissible.2m The court felt the
prison's view of caselaw was inapplicable to the case at bar.25
However, just as the prison tried to use other cases to their
advantage in Benning, the prison, and those like it, will look to case
law to bolster their administrative determinations. As such, the
prison could discern that because its doctrinal determination was
merely "misplaced,"2 6 it could be useful in other areas. In terms of
future religious liberty requests, the prison is not deterred from
using its own doctrinal determinations in order to preserve its
administrative regulations.
B. The Potentialfor Prisons' UnconstitutionalDoctrinal
Determinationsto Persist
1. The Utility of Doctrinal Determinations for Prisons
The doctrinal determination approach is not exclusive to the
prison in Benning; there have been several cases in recent years
where prisons have employed such reasoning.2 87
As noted earlier, in the Seventh Circuit case of Grayson v.
Schuler, a prison determined that an inmate, a member of the
African Hebrew Israelites of Jerusalem, was not allowed to wear

281. Benning, 845 F. Supp. 2d at 1378.
282. See supra notes 270-78.
283. See infra notes 284-87.
284. See Benning, 845 F. Supp. 2d at 1383-84.

285. See id. at 1384.
286. Id. at 1378.
287. See infra notes 288-304 and accompanying text.
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dreadlocks because the prison determined it was not a required
tenet of his faith.m
9 Hazhar Sayed, the prisoner and an
In Sayed v. Profitt,m
adherent of Islam, requested to shower outside of "pod-time" so he
could perform a "complete ablution" in order to observe Jumah.290
Rather than basing its decision on secular, objective factors, the
prison in Sayed determined the prisoner was not entitled to his
request based on a doctrinal determination, even though Sayed did
not bring a RLUIPA claim.291 The prison based its decision on the
text Islam in Focus and determined that Sayed could perform a
"partial ablution" in his cell rather than taking a shower out of podtime to receive a full ablution.29 While the prison in Sayed may
have been able to uphold its regulation without a doctrinal
291
determination,
the prison elected to use an unconstitutional
doctrinal determination to reach its decision.
294
In Koger v. Bryan,
a prisoner and an adherent of
Thelema, requested a kosher diet in accordance with his asserted
faith.295 The prison denied his request due to its determination that
members of Thelema had no dietary requirements.29 6 Once again,
the prison denied a religious liberty request based on its own
297
doctrinal determination.
A particularly egregious doctrinal determination was made
298
by the prison in Nelson v. Miller. In Nelson, Brian Nelson, a
prisoner and practicing Catholic, requested he be afforded a non-

288. Grayson v. Schuler, 666 F.3d 450, 452-53 (7th Cir. 2012)
289. 415 Fed. App'x 946 (10th Cir. 2011).
290. Id. at 947.

291. This issue will be discussed further in Part V.B.2.
292. Id.
293. As will be discussed in Part VI, the prison in Sayed could still have
preserved its regulation by using secular, objective factors.
294. 523 F.3d 789 (7th Cir. 2008).
295. Id. at 794-95.
296. Id.
297. However, as will be discussed below in Part VI, the court in Koger
directly addressed the inherent constitutional problems with the prison's
approach.
298. 570 F.3d 868 (7th Cir. 2007).
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meat diet either every day or on Fridays as an act of penance.299
While the prison did provide non-meat meals for religious
adherents, in order to receive such a meal, a prisoner's request had
to be approved by the prison's chaplain, Carl Miller, an ordained
Lutheran minister.?o In denying Nelson's request, Miller based his
decision on his determination that a non-meat diet "is not required
by the Roman Catholic faith nor does Jesus of God's Word
command abstention from meat on Fridays for penance."3"
Moreover, Miller sought to bolster his justification by citing bible
passages that he thought illustrated "examples of true penance.',302
Notwithstanding Miller's questionable synopsis of Catholic
doctrine, 03 Miller's doctrinal determination is an impermissible way
to handle a prisoner's religious liberty request no matter what the
underlying faith may be.
In many of these cases, the prisons that employ the
doctrinal determination approach go to great lengths to deny
simple and innocuous requests from prisoners. 304 While some
prisons forbid prisoners from growing long hair or beards because
the extra hair can be used to hide contraband, the prison in
Grayson allowed Rastafarians to grow dreadlocks. 30s It seems that if
prisons felt that safety was a concern, prisons would not allow any
long hair at all.3 ' In Sayed, the prisoner was essentially requesting
to be able to take a shower at a different time.307 The prisoner in
Sayed was otherwise allowed to take showers, and it is not clear
what safety concern or administrative burden would have been
compromised by affording the prisoner's request.30 ' The concurring

299. Id. at 871.
300. Id. at 871-72.
301. Id. at 872.

302. Id.
303. See id. at 879 ("The Catholic clergy who opined on the matter ...
both opined that although not required, dietary discipline was a permissible
and laudatory way for Nelson to engage in penance.").
304. See infra notes 305-10 and accompanying text.
305. Grayson,666 F.3d at 453.
306. See id.
307. See Sayed v. Profit, 415 Fed App'x 946, 948 (10th Cir. 2011).
308. See id. at 947-48.
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opinion in Koger went as far as describing the prison's efforts to
deny and litigate Koger's request as a "waste of time."3 0
However, from the prisons' perspective, contesting these
seemingly mundane religious requests is not a waste of time.
Inherent in the nature of managing hundreds of prisoners, many of
whom have a history of violence, every decision a prison makes
must be analyzed in the aggregate.310 An example of this can be
found in one of the justifications for the grooming regulations in
Benning. Despite the apparent innocuous nature of facial hair, the
Benning court noted:
[T]he growth of even a short beard would
obscure facial features and makes hundreds of
decisions that correctional officials have to
make each day more difficult. When the prison
staff must constantly be aware of the status of
inmates beard length, certainly, the job of
identification would be made more difficult."'
Uniformity is a hallmark of prison management, and prison officials
will continually preserve systematic procedures that further their
administrative interests.312 The challenge for prisons in complying
with RLUIPA is that a court can overrule a regulation even if it is
one of general applicability and not aimed at any particular
religion.3 13 If one regulation is found to impose a substantial
burden, it can affect the prison's regulations in general. For
example, Benning notes that there were cases of prison regulations
forbidding beards that were not found to impose a substantial
burden.3 14 However, the court's reluctance to apply this precedent
to earlocks indicated that prisons would have to give extra

309. Koger v. Bryan, 523 F.3d 789, 806 (7th Cir. 2008) (Evans, J.
concurring).
310. See Grayson v. Schuler, 666 F.3d 450, 453 (7th Cir. 2012).
311. Benning v. Georgia, 845 F.Supp. 2d 1372, 1384 n.11 (M.D. Ga. 2012)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
312. See Koger, 523 F.3d at 800.
313. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1 (2006).

314. Benning, 845 F. Supp. 2d. at 1383-84.
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consideration whenever a prisoner requested to wear earlocks,
complicating prison administration."'
Prisons cannot completely cut off prisoners from religious
observances.1 At the same time, when prisons afford a liberty to
one prisoner, they may have to afford the same liberty to many
others. In Grayson, the Seventh Circuit ruled that since the prison
allowed Rastafarians to wear dreadlocks, it could not prevent the
plaintiff from wearing dreadlocks based on security concerns.
When the prison gave a special accommodation for one group, it
opened up the possibility that the prison would have to give the
same accommodation to others. 319 Thus, as the Grayson court
noted, a "prison could not forbid Rastafarians [from wearing] long
hair while permitting American Indians to do so." 320
Notwithstanding the Establishment Clause issues, 321 prisons
will use doctrinal determinations to avoid strict scrutiny. Making
individualized doctrinal determinations allows prisons to afford
religious liberties for one prisoner and deny them for another
without the threat of a regulation being deemed a substantial
burden. 322 When prisons are able to define which requests are
legitimate, whether or not something imposes a substantial burden
thus depends on this doctrinal determination by the prison.323 For
example, the prison in Sayed allowed other prisoners to receive a
complete ablution via showering, but the prison was able to deny
the prisoner in question his individual request due to its doctrinal
determination that he was not required to do a complete
ablution.32 4

315. See id.
316. See Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126, 137-38 (2003) (Stevens, J.,
concurring).
317. See infra 318-21 and accompanying text.
318. Grayson v. Schuler, 666 F.3d 450, 453 (7th Cir. 2012).
319. See id.
320. Id. at 455 (citing Reed v. Faulkner, 842 F.2d 960, 963 (7th Cir.
1988)).
321. See infra notes 322-25 and accompanying text.
322. See Sayed v. Profitt, 415 Fed. App'x 946, 948-50 (10th Cir. 2011).
323. See id.

324. Id. at 947-48.

2013]PRISONERS' RELIGIOUS LIBERTY REQUESTS 581
2. The Traditional Deference Given to Prison Administration
Courts are generally reluctant to second guess the judgment
of prison administrators.' This was a motivating factor in the
formation of the Turner factors, as Justice Sandra Day O'Connor
noted "prison administrators. . . , and not the courts, [are] to make

the difficult judgments concerning institutional operations."32 6 As
noted above, RFRA afforded the same protections as RLUIPA,
and while RFRA was still enforced against the states, a committee
report noted that "in most [RFRA] cases, courts found for prison
officials."3 2 7 Furthermore, the committee report states that courts
tended to not publish their opinions when they did rule in favor of a
prisoner." Like RFRA, RLUIPA does completely ensure that
prisoners' viable religious rights will not be infringed.
Even with the requirement of strict scrutiny under
RLUIPA, courts will often decide in favor of the prison.129 For
example, in McFaul v. Valenzuela,so the prison had a regulation
that prevented prisoners from having any items that cost more than
twenty-five dollars. 33 ' Anson McFaul, the prisoner and a practicing
Celtic Druid, wanted a pentagram amulet with a black onyx stone
that cost $61.95. 332 The prison felt that McFaul should be able to use
an amulet already in his possession and denied his request.333
McFaul explained why the particular pentagram's shape was
important to his religion and offered a sworn statement from his
"spiritual teacher."3 34 There were also indications that other
prisoners had been allowed to retain items over the twenty-five

325. See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987).
326. Id. at 89 (citing Jones v. N.C. Prisoners' Labor Union, Inc., 433 U.S.
119, 128 (1977).
327. Boerne Hearings, supra note 208, at 11 (statement of Marc D. Stern,
Legal Dir., Am. Jewish Cong.).

328. Id.
329. See infra notes 330-41 and accompanying text.
330. 684 F.3d 564 (5th Cir. 2012).
331. Id. at 569.

332. Id. at 568-69.
333. Id. at 569-70.
334. Id. at 574.
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dollar limit.3 ' However, the Fifth Circuit ruled that McFaul's
explanations were conclusory and that McFaul provided "mixed
evidence regarding the central-ity of the onyx" to his religion.
Neither RLUIPA nor the Constitution requires that the
religious practice be a central tenant of the religion. 337 Given
McFaul's attempt to substantiate why he needed the amulet, the
McFaul court may have overemphasized how important a practice
has to be within a religion in order for a regulation to constitute a
substantial burden. However, the court was more concerned with
subjecting the prison's judgment to strict scrutiny, noting that
holding McFaul had established a substantial burden would "open
the door to finding that any inmate's assertion constitutes a
sincerely held religious belief and that any limitation on that belief
constitutes a substantial burden ....
3. The Usefulness of Doctrinal Determinations Outside of
RLUIPA Claims
While RLUIPA gives prisoners enhanced rights, they are
statutory rights that can be repealed just as easily as they were
granted.3 It would not be completely impossible for RLUIPA to
be removed or altered.34 1 If RLUIPA is no longer in effect and
prisons are allowed to make doctrinal determinations, prisoners will
be at an even greater risk to being subject to arbitrary regulations
of their religious practices.342 As noted above, courts are generally
335. Id. at 569.
336. Id. at 577.
337. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-5(7)(A) (2006). See also United States v. Ballard,
322 U.S. 78, 86 (1944) ("Men may believe what they cannot prove.").
338. See McFaul, 684 F.3d at 574-77.
339. See id. at 577 (citing Smith v. Allen, 502 F.3d 1255, 2278 (11th Cir.
2007)).
340. See Grayson v. Schuler, 666 F.3d 450, 453 (7th Cir. 2012).
341. See supra notes 223-25; see also Cutter v. Wilkson, 544 U.S. 709, 726
(2005) (noting the possibility for "as-applied challenges" if the requests for
religious accommodations under RLUIPA become "excessive, impose
unjustified burdens on other institutionalized persons, or jeopardize the
effective functioning of an institution").
342. See supra notes 206-12 and accompanying text.
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reluctant to second guess prison administrators' judgments.343 This
will be especially true should there be no possibility of strict
scrutiny under RLUIPA.?" For example, in Sayed, the Tenth
Circuit expressly endorsed the prison's doctrinal determination,
holding that "[b]ased on Dr. Abdalati's description of partial
ablution, we conclude that no material factual dispute exists
regarding whether Sayed can perform partial ablution at the sink in

his cell." 345
Even without RLUIPA, prisons may still find it
advantageous to make doctrinal determinations in a prisoner's
religious request. 346 In Sayed, the prison still asserted its doctrinal
determination as a reason for denying Sayed's request at trial,
despite not being subject to RLUIPA.347 Whether or not the prison
had a valid reason for its regulation was never addressed because
Sayed's request was not considered problematic enough to warrant
any review of the regulation at all. 3 4 The prison was able to
undercut the legitimacy of Sayed's request without ever having to
address the validity of its own regulation.349 Sayed shows that
prisons' doctrinal determinations can be useful in negating
prisoners' religious liberty, even without the possibility of strict
scrutiny.350 Accordingly, even if RLUIPA is no longer in effect,
unconstitutional doctrinal determinations will persist.
Unless courts explicitly note the fundamental constitutional
problems
with prisons'
doctrinal
determinations,
these
343. See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987) (noting that courts
should be cautious in questioning the judgments of prison administrators).
344. See Koger v. Bryan, 523 F.3d 789, 796 (7th Cir. 2008) (stating that if
there is a substantial burden to a sincere religious practice, courts are to apply
strict scrutiny to a prison regulation even if it is one of general applicability).
345. Sayed v. Profitt, 415 Fed. App'x 946, 949 (10th Cir. 2011).
346. See infra notes 347-51.
347. See Sayed, 415 F. App'x at 948. The prison was able to secure a
summary judgment based on its determination that "partial ablution is
acceptable prior to Jumah." Id.
348. See id. at 949-50.
349. See id.
350. See id. at 948-49. Based on its determination that partial ablution
was an acceptable practice for Sayed, the prison then had little difficulty
showing that he could perform the ritual with his cell sink. Id.
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determinations will continue.35 ' This problem seems to have been
recognized in Grayson. After deciding for the prisoner-plaintiff on
Equal Protection grounds, Judge Richard Posner elaborated
extensively on a prisoner's right to exercise non-orthodox religious
beliefs.5 Judge Posner expressly noted that "[p]rison chaplains
may not determine which religious observances are permissible
because [they are] orthodox" practices within a religion.5 Despite
the general notion that pro se litigants should not be given any
special treatment in litigation,3 54 Judge Posner went out of his way
to include RLUIPA with the prisoner's claim, giving special
consideration to RLUIPA, despite it not being controlling in the
court's holding. 3 Given this reference to RLUIPA, it seems that
Judge Posner may have been trying to call attention to the
constitutional issues of prisons' doctrinal determinations in
evaluating prisoners' religious liberty requests.
VI. PREVENTING THE ENTRENCHMENT OF UNCONSTITUTIONAL
DOCTRINAL DETERMINATIONS

A. Ways for Courts to Address Prisons'DoctrinalDeterminations

A court's first option in addressing doctrinal determination
issues can be found in RLUIPA itself.35 6 For example, in Koger, the
prison had a policy of determining whether a religious liberty would
351. See infra notes 352-56 and accompanying text.
352. Grayson v. Schuler, 666 F.3d 450, 453-54 (7th Cir. 2012).
353. Id. at 455 (citing Vinning-El v. Evans, 657 F.3d 591, 595 (7th Cir.
2011)).
354. Jackson v. St. Lawrence, CV410-291, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 68860,
at *5 (S.D. Ga. June 27, 2011) (citing Sec'y, Fla. Dept. of Corr. v. Baker, 406 F.
App'x 416, 422 (11th Cir. 2010)).
355. See Grayson, 666 F.3d at 451. The plaintiff sought damages against
the defendant in his personal and official capacity. Id. The court held that the
state's sovereign immunity bars a plaintiff from seeking damages in a
defendant's official capacity, and that RLUIPA itself does not provide for
damages in a defendant's personal capacity. Id. (citations omitted).
356. See infra notes 357-66 and accompanying text.
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be granted based on whether it was central to the religion's doctrine
and requiring this to be proven through a clergy verification
letter.31 7 The prison would only grant a religious liberty request if it
determined the observance was supported by religious doctrine via
the letter.3ss In ruling on the inmate's RLUIPA claim, the court
held that it was incorrect for the prison to base its decision on the
centrality of a religious practice respective to its doctrine.3 19
Accordingly, the Seventh Circuit went on to hold that the clergy
verification requirement constituted a substantial burden on the
inmate's sincerely held religious belief.36
In holding for the prisoner, Koger took additional steps to
show that the prison undertook an impermissible analysis under
RLUIPA, noting that the prison officials did "exactly what
RLUIPA provides they cannot."3 6' The court recognized that the
prison was using a systematic approach that was not relevant to a
RLUIPA determination. 362 More pointedly, the court's additional
language serves as guidance to prisons that, in order to comply with
RLUIPA, they should cease such doctrinal determinations.363 Not
only was the prison's religious determination unpersuasive, it was
improper and should not be relevant to a court's ruling.3 6 A prison
357. See Koger v. Bryan, 523 F.3d 789, 794-95 (7th Cir. 2008).
358. See id.
359. Id. at 799.
360. See id. at 797-800. Koger's analysis of whether the belief was sincere
was much more akin to a "good-faith test," noting that Koger chose to
continue to request the religious liberty under a religion that he knew the
prison administration was unfamiliar with, which further indicated his sincerity
because his chances of achieving the liberty would have been greater under a
traditional religion. See id. at 797. Ultimately finding for the plaintiff, the court
held that the prison's requirements were not part of a compelling state
interest. Id. at 801. Additionally, the court found that interest asserted by the
prison, administration and order, were not compelling, and even if they were,
it was not the least restrictive means by which the interest could be achieved.
Id.
361. See id. at 803 (emphasis in original).
362. See id.
363. See id. at 803 ("The prison officials violated this clearly established
right because they required exactly what RLUIPA provides they cannot . ..
364. See id.
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reviewing Koger thus might be persuaded to consider other secular
reasons in evaluating a prisoner's religious liberty request.
In addition to noting how doctrinal determinations are not
persuasive under RLUIPA, courts should directly address the
Establishment Clause problems this approach creates. If a doctrinal
determination is only addressed within the terms of RLUIPA, a
prison could discern that their doctrinal determination was not
inherently flawed, and such an approach still could be used for
handling religious liberty requests until the prison must address a
RLUIPA claim. 6 Koger recognized this issue by addressing the
prison's actions on a more fundamental, constitutional level, noting
the prison used a "clergy-as-arbiter-of-orthodoxy standard that had
long been rejected." 6 ' Koger's holding indicates that the prison is
not just on the wrong end of the court's statutory interpretation the prison's actions are questionable under an established
constitutional standard.3 68 Prisons seeking to regulate prisoners'
religious observance requests would be advised to reach their
conclusions outside of religious doctrine after reading Koger's
holding.
While Koger's admonishment of the prison may have been
driven by its attempt to justify their qualified immunity ruling, the
Seventh Circuit also seemed to recognize that prisons would look to
365. See id. at 801. The court seems to try to provide additional guidance
in order to guide the prison's focus. See id. ("[P]rison officials are still entitled
to the benefit of the long-standing requirement that a prisoner provide
sufficient indicia that his request is borne of a sincerely held religious belief.").
366. See supra Part V.B.2.
367. See Koger, 523 F.3d at 803. The court cites two cases, Frazee v. 1I.
Dep't of Emp't Sec., 489 U.S. 829 (1989), and Jackson v. Mann, 196 F.3d 316
(2d Cir. 1999), that were decided on constitutional grounds when the
government was attempting to justify an action based on a doctrinal
determination. See Koger, 523 F.3d at 803 (citing Frazee, 489 U.S. at 834;
Jackson, 196 F.3d at 320).
368. See Koger, 523 F.3d at 802-03.
369. See id. The court's constitutional language is driven by its discussion
of whether Koger would be prevented from receiving damages due to
qualified immunity. Id. at 802. The court noted that there was a clear standard
established by statutes and the Constitution that prevented a prison from
making a decision based on the prison's own doctrinal determination. See id.
at 802-03.
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its decision for future guidance. In contrast to Benning, Koger
makes it clear that the prison was fundamentally wrong in its
approach to addressing the prisoner's religious liberty request,
which decreases the possibility a prison will continue to use
impermissible justifications in their decision making process. 70 As
noted above, prisons consider it advantageous to make decisions on
religious liberties based on their own doctrinal determinations. 7 1 In
order to prevent them from doing this, courts should provide clear
indications of the implications of such actions even if only
technically making a ruling under RLUIPA.
Referencing constitutional concerns in a RLUIPA ruling
will not necessarily result in an over-broad determination. 372 Courts
will seek to reach their decisions on statutory grounds before
making a constitutional decision, and RLUIPA provides ample
means to do this. 373 At the same time, RLUIPA issues are
inherently constitutional issues.374 Accordingly, the appropriate role
of government in regulating religiously motivated conduct are an
appropriate part of the discussion in a RLUIPA decision.3' Noting
fundamental concerns will not result in a new constitutional
decision every time this issue comes before a court. Similar to the
approach taken in Koger, courts are well within their right to base
their central holding on the statutory claim and then provide
further guidance with basic constitutional notions. 376
By directly addressing the prison's doctrinal determination,
the Seventh Circuit's opinion in Nelson shows that courts may
directly correct the practice of doctrinal determinations.7 As noted
370. See supra note 414.

371.
372.
373.
374.
Congress
liberties).

See supra Part V.B.2.
See infra notes 373-77 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 357-62 and accompanying text.
See Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 715 & n.5 (2005) (noting that
was concerned with unjustified curtailments of prisoners' religious

375. See id.

376. See Koger v. Bryan, 523 F.3d 789, 801-03 (7th Cir. 2008). The court
decided its case first based on the fact that the prison violated RLUIPA, then
the court undertook a discussion of what was wrong with the prison's
approach. Id.
377. See infra notes 378-83 and accompanying text.
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above, the chaplain in Nelson made a doctrinal determination in
violation of the Establishment Clause. 7 The court expressly
affirmed Koger's approach to substantial burden analysis and ruled
that the prison's determination constituted a substantial burden on
Nelson's sincerely held religious belief.3 9 Similar to Koger, the
Nelson court explicitly addressed the shortcomings with Miller's
doctrinal determination, noting "[it simply is not appropriate for a
prison official to argue with a prisoner regarding the objective truth
of a prisoner's religious belief." 0 The court still took care to
expressly note that the chaplain's letter "improperly entangled him
in matters of religious interpretation" even though court
acknowledged that Miller's determination was not driven by malice
towards Catholicism.3 8 ' Thus, the Nelson court's willingness to
expressly address the prison administrator's reasoning shows that it
is appropriate for courts to expressly the practice and result of
doctrinal determinations in their opinions. 382
B. Suggestive Approaches for Prisons'RL UIPA Compliance
Managing prisoners' religious requests under RLUIPA may
be difficult, but it is not impossible. 383 While prisons cannot cut off
prisoners from religious practice entirely, prisoners legitimately and
constitutionally do not have the same expectations of freedom in

378. See supra notes 299-304 and accompanying text.
379. Nelson v. Miller, 570 F.3d 868, 879-80 (7th Cir. 2009).
380. Id. at 881.
381. Id.
382. In slight contrast to Koger, the plaintiff in Nelson actually brought
an Establishment Clause claim. Id. Accordingly, the court addressed the

doctrinal determination expressly in a section that was separate from the
RLUIPA claim. Id. at 881-82. However, given the Nelson court's willingness
to make specific note of the doctrinal determination, it appears the court
would have made note of this in their RLUIPA discussion had the plaintiff not
made a specific Establishment Clause claim.
383. See Cutter, 544 U.S. at 725-26 (noting that prisons operated for
years under strict scrutiny); Koger, 523 F.3d at 802 (noting "RLUIPA did not
announce a new standard, but shored up protections . . . which had seen

frequent litigation in the prison context").
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their religious practices as the general public. 38 RLUIPA seeks to
preserve prisoners' religious rights, but it should not be construed
to hamstring prison administrators' judgment.
Questioning whether a religious observance is sincere is a
permissible inquiry under the Establishment Clause and
RLUIPA. Prisons operate under budget constraints and have a
right not to provide special privileges where it can be objectively
determined the prisoner is not serious about a religious
observance.38 For example, in Gardner v. Riska,3 a prison
correctly denied kosher food to an inmate who repeatedly
purchased non-kosher food from the prison's canteen.389 Likewise,
in Sharp v. Johnson,39 the prison could deny a prisoner's request to
lead his own religious service because of concerns that the prisoner
was "more interested in placing himself in a leadership position
over a group of inmates than obtaining a genuine religious
accommodation."
In contrast to doctrinal determinations, a
prisoner's motive for requesting a religious observance is a valid
inquiry for prison administration, and prisons may permissibility
reject requests if they find the requests to be insincere.

384. See O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 348 (1987) (citing
Pell v. Procunier 417 U.S. 817, 822-23 (1974); Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S.
396, 412 (1974)).
385. See Cutter, 544 U.S. at 723 (noting that "due deference to the
experience and expertise" should be given to the judgment of prison
administrators when a court is evaluating a RLUIPA claim (internal
quotations omitted)).
386. See Koger, 523 F.3d at 799-800.
387. See Gardner v. Riska, 444 F. App'x 353, 355 (11th Cir. 2011) (noting
that despite requesting Kosher meals, the record showed the plaintiff bought
numerous non-Kosher items from the prisons canteen and heated and
consumed these items in front of canteen workers). But see Grayson v.
Schuler, 666 F.3d 450, 454 (7th Cir. 2012) (in addressing sincerity, the court
noted "for where would religion be without its backsliders, penitents, and
prodigal sons?").
388. 444 F. App'x 353 (11th Cir. 2011).
389. Id. at 355.
390. 669 F.3d 144 (3d Cir. 2012).
391. Id. at 148, 155.

590

FIRST AMENDMENT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 11I

A prison may also use doctrinal evidence presented by the
prisoner to evaluate the prisoner's motives for the request.39 For
example in Smith v. Allen,393 the inmate asserted that since many of
the other world's religions used a quartz crystal, he should be able
to use one when practicing Odinism. 394 However, none of the
sources the inmate used to justify this referenced Odinism, and the
prison denied the inmates request, calling it "incomplete and
sketchy."395 In ruling on the inmate's subsequent RLUIPA claim,
the court in Allen held that the inmate failed to establish that the
prison's ruling constituted anything more than "an inconvenience"
to his religious exercise.' Accordingly, the inmate was unable to
establish a substantial burden, and the prison was entitled to
summary judgment.397
In contrast to making doctrinal determinations, the prison
does not violate the Establishment Clause by responding to an
inmate's own doctrinal justifications.39 8 For example in Allen, the
prison did not say that the crystal could not be important to an
Odinist.'99 Rather, the prison analyzed the plaintiff's logic.o This
distinction is fine but important. The prison did not make an
impermissible doctrinal determination; the prison asserted that the
inmate did not provide enough evidence to establish a substantial
burden.41 This approach allowed the prison in Allen to comply with

392. See infra notes 393-98 and accompanying text.
393. 502 F.3d 1255 (11th Cir. 2007).
394. Id. at 1278.
395. Id. at 1262.
396. Id. at 1278-79.
397. Id. at 1279.
398. See infra notes 399-02 and accompanying text.
399. See Allen, 502 F.3d. at 1278 ("There is no mention in these third
party sources of Odinism, nor is there any indication that a small, quartz
crystal is necessary to observe the rites of Odinism.").
400. See id. at 1278 (11th Cir. 2007) ("Indeed, Smith has failed to
establish the relevance of the crystal to his practice of Odinism, as he was
obligated to do in order to demonstrate that the denial of that item would
significantly hamper his religious observance.").

401. See id.
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RLUIPA, the Establishment Clause, and still preserve its
administrative decision.1 0
RLUIPA has the potential to be less deferential to a prison
regulation than a First Amendment claim.40 With this in mind,
responding to a prisoner's justifications can be a viable option for a
prison in responding to a prisoner's religious liberty requests in
general.4" For example, the prison in Sayed could have upheld its
regulation without a doctrinal determination. As the plaintiff, it was
Sayed's burden to show how the regulation adversely affected his
religious practice.4 However, Sayed offered little to no specific
evidence showing how his religion was burdened by the prison's
decision.4 Accordingly, the prison could simply determine that
Sayed failed to offer sufficient evidence that showed how his
religious exercise was adversely affected. The prison's decision
would not be based on a doctrinal determination. Rather, it would
be based on the objective and practical conclusion that Sayed could
perform the requested religious observance in his cell without being
given any special treatment that would burden prison resources.
Thus, prisons can still preserve their prison regulations without
using doctrinal determinations.
CONCLUSION
In seeking to manage their penological interests with a
prisoner's religious interests under the First Amendment and
RLUIPA, prisons are well within their right to question whether a
prisoner's religious belief is sincere. Additionally, prisons may also
objectively evaluate the specific justifications a prisoner uses to
establish that there is a substantial burden. However, prisons may
not make their own individualized determinations of what practices
a prisoner's religion does or does not support. Doctrinal
402.
403.
404.
405.

See supra notes 400-02.
See supra Part IV.
See infra notes 406-08 and accompanying text.
Sayed v. Profitt, 415 F. App'x 946, 947 (10th Cir. 2011).

406. Id. Sayed appears to have acquiesced to the prison's use of Islam in
Focus as an accurate statement of his beliefs. Id.
407. See id. at 949-50.
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determinations are contrary to the fundamental Establishment
Clause notion that government entities should not be authorities on
religion, and despite the constitutional complexities of
incarceration, this Establishment Clause principle is applicable in
the prison context. In order to ensure that prisons do not make
doctrinal determinations, courts should expressly note the
constitutional problems with the doctrinal determination approach.
When courts directly address the Establishment Clause problems
with doctrinal determinations, prisons will be less likely to employ
this unconstitutional method of addressing prisoners' religious
liberty requests under RLUIPA.

